But to test some of these hypotheses, as the umbrella of the TNP (1968) and its relation with the rebellious States and the terrorism, let us consider that, of one it has ahead attacked nuclear, state or terrorist, the States of the TNP (1968) would meet ahead of a quandary without solution: to answer or not to an attack in the same ratio, that is, with nuclear weapons. The first legal impediment would be proportionality of the reply (of the retortion), since nuclear weapons, as well as the chemical and biological weapons, do not distinguish between terrorists and civilians. As, it would be the identification of the responsible ones, nominated governments, not States, in connection or not with terrorists, as it was the case of the Taleb government in the Afeganisto in relation to the terrorists of the Al-Qaeda: how to punish the Government without punishing the State? Thus, if the quandary of the TNP (1968) would not have solution, as one treated formal one and legally binding politics would have preponderantly to be considered in its source, that is, as one ' ' umbrella of dissuaso' ' , whose effectiveness cannot be measured in terms of guarantees effective (guarantees of execution), since efficient guarantee some can emerge of a system of balance that more if does not base only nor relations between Estadospotncias, but in the competition of other rebellious States e, mainly, of not-state actors, as the terrorists, for one parcels out technical limitless of being able, in the case of being able to militate, long ago privilege of few States. In the military field, Ir and Coreia of the north dispute place still more enter the State-powers in the military source, since comparativily to the economic sphere it is much more easy to become a power producing nuclear bombs, if already technology for this is had. These comments under the legal source and politics of the TNP (1968), and of its balance of being able in the nuclear sphere, allow to conclude that if it deals with an instrument International law of contradictory content, since it is established in an absence of balance of being able to militate for the resignation to nuclear weapons e, to exactly time, in the maintenance of a polar region of multiple powers (unimultipolarizao) that it allows can it withhold such weapons, as a protective umbrella that must be efficient, even though to use them. .